

Counsel for Parties.

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of the case and not to the jurisdiction of the court. An erroneous conclusion in that regard can only be reviewed on appeal or error, or in such appropriate way as may be provided. *Louisville Trust Company v. Cominger*, 184 U. S. 18, 26; *Ex parte Gordon*, 104 U. S. 515.

And while proceedings in contempt may be said to be *sui generis*, the present judgment is in effect a judgment in a criminal case, over which this court has no jurisdiction on error. Section 5, act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826, c. 517, as amended by the act of January 20, 1897, 29 Stat. 492, c. 68; *Chetwood's Case*, 165 U. S. 443, 462; *Tinsley v. Anderson*, 171 U. S. 101, 105; *Cary Manufacturing Company v. Acme Flexible Clasp Company*, 187 U. S. 427, 428.

Writ of error dismissed.

TUBMAN v. BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD
COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 574. Submitted May 13, 1903.—Decided June 1, 1903.

1. The general rule is that a final judgment cannot be set aside by the court which rendered it, on application made after the close of the term at which it was entered; and as this case comes within that rule the judgment is affirmed.
2. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, but inasmuch as if it had entertained it, that court would have been compelled to affirm the order appealed from, this court is not obliged, in the circumstances disclosed by the record, to modify or reverse even if that court might have maintained jurisdiction of the appeal.

THE case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. William A. Meloy for plaintiff in error.

Mr. George E. Hamilton and *Mr. Frederic D. McKenney*
for defendant in error.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The declaration in this action was filed March 26, 1895, and several demurrers were interposed thereto the following June. August 6, 1901, the case was dismissed for want of prosecution. After the term at which that judgment was entered had expired, and on May 19, 1902, plaintiff made a motion to set it aside, and the motion was denied. From the order denying the motion, plaintiff took an appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, which was dismissed, and this writ of error then allowed. The case comes before us on a motion to dismiss or affirm. The appeal to the Court of Appeals was dismissed on the ground that the order overruling the motion to vacate the judgment of dismissal was not the subject of appeal, and we think there was color for the motion here to dismiss the writ of error. But in the view we take, we must decline to sustain that motion, and will dispose of the case on the motion to affirm.

In its opinion the Court of Appeals said, among other things, that the "motion to vacate was not made until after the lapse of more than two terms of the court in which the original judgment was entered. It is not shown that there was any fraud or surprise in procuring the judgment of dismissal of the action by the court." The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the District obviously agreed in this finding, and a careful examination of the record affords no basis for questioning the conclusion, if it were permissible for us to do so. The general rule is that a final judgment cannot be set aside on application made after the close of the term at which it was entered, by the court which rendered it, because the case has passed beyond the control of the court. *Bronson v. Schulten*, 104 U. S. 410, 415; *Phillips v. Negley*, 117 U. S. 665.

In the latter case jurisdiction was taken on error to review a final order setting aside a judgment on motion made at a subsequent term. And in *Hume v. Bowie*, 148 U. S. 245, *Phillips v. Negley* was considered, and the distinction between a judgment ordering a new trial when the court has jurisdiction to make such an order and a judgment where such jurisdiction does not exist was pointed out. See *Macfarland v. Brown*, 187 U. S. 239, 243.

In the present case the motion to set aside was denied, not granted, and as it was made after the lapse of the term, and came within no exception, the general rule was applicable. If then the Court of Appeals had entertained jurisdiction, the result would have been an affirmance; and even if the court erred in declining jurisdiction, the difference between dismissing the appeal and affirming the order does not, in the circumstances, require reversal or modification.

Judgment affirmed.

WRIGHT *v.* HENKEL.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

No. 661. Argued April 28, 29, 1903.—Decided June 1, 1903.

1. The general principle of international law in cases of extradition is that the act on account of which extradition is demanded must be a crime in both countries.
2. As to the offence charged in the case, this applicable treaty embodies that principle in terms by requiring it to be "made criminal by the laws of both countries."
3. If the offence charged is criminal by the laws of the demanding country and by the laws of the State of the United States in which the alleged fugitive is found, it comes within the treaty and is extraditable.
4. Bail cannot ordinarily be granted in extradition cases, but it is not held that the Circuit Courts may not in any case, and whatever the special circumstances, extend that relief.

WHITAKER WRIGHT applied to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York for writs of *habeas corpus* and certiorari on March 20, 1903, by a petition which alleged:

(1.) That he was a citizen of the United States restrained of his liberty by the Marshal of the United States for the Southern District of New York, by virtue of a warrant dated March 16, 1903, issued by Thomas Alexander, "United States Commis-